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Abstract
In this paper I consider the following problem: there is a collection of
exogenously given socially feasible sets, and for each one of them, each
one of a group of individuals chooses from an individually feasible set.
The fact that the product of the individually feasible sets is larger than
the socially feasible set notwithstanding, there arises no conflict between
individuals. Assuming that individual preferences are random, I here
characterize collective choices in terms of the way in which individual
preferences must co-vary in order to explain them. I do this by combining
standard revealed preference theory and its counterpart under random
preferences. I also argue that there exist collective choices that cannot be
rationalized, and hence that the individual rationality assumption can be
refuted.
Keywords : Revealed preference, random utility; collective choice; in-
dividual rationality.
JEL classification : D70, D74, D12.
When one is traveling by plane, if the flight is long enough, chances are that
one is going to be oﬀered a (rather limited) menu of meal choices, say “beef or
chicken.” It seems reasonable to assume that each passenger makes her own meal
choice based only on what she feels like eating, without giving any consideration
whatsoever to whether or not there will be enough of both choices to attend the
demands of all the passengers in the flight. Quite likely, if all the passengers
chose to order the same meal, there would be not enough of that one meal to
serve all of them. However, it is also true that in many occasions the choices of
the passengers are such that everyone can be served her own choice.
∗This paper is based on chapter 4 of my Ph.D. dissertation at Brown University, “On
Individually-Rational Choice and Equilibrium.” I would like to thank my main advisor,
Herakles Polemarchakis, for his guidance, patience and support. Comments by Indrajit Ray,
Rajiv Vohra, Susan Snyder, Moshe Buchinsky and seminar participants at Brown and at the
2003 European Meeting of the Econometric Society are also gratefully acknowledged. I also
thank Brown and Banco de la República for their financial support. All mistakes are of course
mine.
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The latter is just an example of a situation in which a group of individuals
face a collective choice problem, where the decision corresponds to a vector
of multiple dimensions, each individual chooses some of the dimensions of the
vector considering only an individual feasibility constraint, but where the set
that is feasible, from the perspective of the whole group, is strictly smaller than
the Cartesian product of the individually feasible sets. Indeed, as Debreu (1952)
has pointed out:
“In a wide class of social systems each agent has a range of actions
among which he selects one. His choice is not, however, entirely free
and the actions of all the other agents determine the subset to which
his selection is restricted. Once the action of every agent is given,
the outcome of the social activity is known. The preferences of each
agent yield his complete ordering of the outcomes and each one of
them tries by choosing his action in his restricting subset to bring
about the best outcome according to his own preferences.”
In the example, suppose that there are I passengers in the plane, and for
simplicity assume that all of them want to eat something, either beef or chicken.
Denumerate the passengers from 1 to I and denote by 0 the decision to order
beef and by 1 the decision to order chicken. Then, for each individual the
feasible set is {0, 1} and the collective choice is a vector x = (xi)Ii=1 ∈ {0, 1}I .
However, if the number of meals available is XC for the choice chicken and XB
for the choice beef (hopefully, XC+ XB > I), then the socially feasible set is
just
n
x ∈ {0, 1}I
¯¯¯
I −XB 6
PI
i=1 xi 6 XC
o
, which may very well be a proper
subset of {0, 1}I (for example if I = 2, XC = XB = 1).
If one observes a choice situation like this and the collective choice is socially
feasible, one can argue at least two explanations. The first one is that enough
members of the group did actually take into account the collective constraints
and were able to accommodate them by means of their own choices. An alterna-
tive explanation, however, does not require one to drop the assumption of pure
individual rationality: if individual preferences just happen to be such that the
profile of purely individually-rational choices lies within the feasible set, then
no individual really needs to consider the collective constraints when making
her or his own choice. In the example, if it just so happens that the number of
passengers who at the time when meals are being served prefer chicken to beef
is between I −XB and XC , then no passenger will see her choice unserved nor
will she have to accommodate her choice to the available number of meals.
The problem is indeed very simple when only one collective choice problem is
being studied. Now, consider a more general and interesting situation in which
there is a family of collectively feasible sets, which I will call collective budgets,
and in which each individual has to choose from the projection of these budgets
into her own choice set. Suppose that for each collective budget, a collective
choice has been observed, and one wants to test the hypothesis that such choice
was made from purely individually-rational decisions. If one assumes that all
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the individuals have tastes that have not varied along the observation, then the
test is again somewhat simple: all one needs to do is check the satisfaction of
the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences individual by individual, using as
individual budgets the corresponding projections of the collective budgets.
This solution to the problem, in particular, and Revealed Preference Theory,
in general, can be harshly criticized for their assumption that individual pref-
erences are an invariant concept. Specifically, observation of human behavior,
in experiments as in real life, and even simple introspection suggest that prefer-
ences change in a random manner. Mathematical Psychologists have since long
ago observed in their laboratories that a correct explanation of human choice
has to take into account the random character that individual preferences have,
and have established the so called “random utility theory,” which seems to have
received less attention in economics.
When the problem of collective choice is studied under the assumption of
random preferences, a new and interesting dimension of analysis appears: one
can no longer just require that individual choices be such that their profiles lie
within the collective budgets; now, preferences have to be correlated in a way
such that these profiles cannot be outside the collective budgets with positive
probability. Of course, one can dismiss this aspect of the problem by assuming
that individual preferences are determined independently and restricting the
analysis to data sets consisting with such assumption. In this paper I have
chosen to concentrate precisely on the joint determination of preferences, which
allows consistency with a larger class of data sets. One can think of reasons
why the assumption of independence may not be suitable for analysis in all
cases. Changes in weather wuite likely aﬀect individual preferences in a common
direction. Or fashion: it usually aﬀects significant gorups of people in a similar
way, while some others may rebel against it (still not being independent). The
problem under independence is indeed interesting but will not be dealt with
here.
In this paper I study the joint distribution of random preferences that can
explain, together with pure individual rationality, probabilistic distributions
of collective choices over collective budgets. In order to avoid confusion, an
important distinction must be made here: I deal with a collective-choice problem
but not with an aggregate problem. That is, my interest is in explaining profiles
of choices, not aggregations of choices. moreover, in the general cases I deal with,
individual choices need not even be physically comparable (which is not the case
of the motivational example above) in the sense that diﬀerent indidvidual pick
diﬀerent dimensions of the collective choice and these dimensions may represent
diﬀerent physical features, like when a member of a group decides at what time
an event that the group is organizing will take place, while some other member
picks the venue for the realization of such event.
The results obtained here are based on the application of the separating
hyperplane theorem given by McFadden and Richter (1990), where the finite
individual random choice problem is characterized. As McFadden and Richter
claim, their result is more general than the application they are explicit about.
I consider the more general case of collective choice over not-necessarily-finite
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domains, and impose the assumptions that are necessary to make this case
compatible with the condition derived by them. When this more general setting
is considered, however, an unpleasant feature of the McFadden-Richter solution
makes itself obvious: their result requires the analyst to specify the finite family
of (profiles of) preferences that will be allowed to have a positive probability
when attempting to explain the observed data. Although this may be acceptable
under finite domains (where one can use the family of all possible orders), it
is quite restricting in the infinite case, as it narrows the concept or rationality
tremendously: the fact that the data set appears at variance with the rationality
concept may be due solely to the family of preferences and in no way means that
there do not exist families of preferences (and distributions over them) that are
able to explain the data via rationality. I overcome this diﬃculty by combining
standard revealed preference theory and the McFadden-Richter condition, so as
to weaken the rationalitzability requirement to just the existence of a family
of preferences (controlling only its cardinality) and a probability distribution
over it that are able to exactly explain the data. I also show that, regardless of
the cardinality allowed, there do exist data sets which cannot be explained by
individual rationality under random preferences.
The paper is organized as follows: in the next section I state the problem
more formally, considering a general abstract case, and also the case of con-
sumption choice, which by a slight diﬀerence is not a particular instance of
the general case; then, in section 2, I show that one can apply the result of
McFadden and Richter to the case of individually-rational collective choice, for
a given set of profiles of preferences of a group of individuals; in section 3, I
define and characterize individually-rational collective choice, when the set of
profiles of preferences is not given, but one is allowed to construct it. In both
sections I consider finite and infinite choice sets, as well as the particular case
of consumption choices. I finally show examples of nonrationalizable data sets.
1 Stochastic collective choices:
1.1 The general case:
Suppose that there is a nonempty, finite set I = {1, ..., I} of decision makers.
By nature, each decision maker i ∈ I chooses from a nonempty set Xi, which
I will call i’s choice set. In individual-choice theory, a budget is a nonempty
subset of a choice set. Here, a collective budget is a nonempty subset of the
Cartesian product of all the choice sets. I assume that one observes a nonempty
family, B, of collective budgets. Formally,1
B ⊆ P
ÃY
i∈I
Xi
!
\ {∅} ,B 6= ∅
Since it is over these budgets that collective choices are made, I assume
1For any set Z, I denote by P (Z) its power set, which is the collection of all of its subsets.
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that for each B ∈ B one observes a probability measure. Formally, then, I
endow each B ∈ B with a σ-algebra ΣB and assume that a probability measure
γB : Σ
B −→ [0, 1] has been observed. These are all the elements that I assume
are being observed. They constitute a “stochastic collective choice.” Formally:
Definition 1 A stochastic collective choice isn
I, ¡Xi¢i∈I ,B, (ΣB, γB)B∈Bo
Throughout the paper, for the general case I maintain the assumption that
the following condition holds:
Condition 1 B is finite, and for each B ∈ B, ΣB is finite.
This assumption is reasonable since data collected in real life is likely to sat-
isfy it. It must be noticed, however, that I am not assuming that the individual
choice sets, Xi, are finite.
For the general case, the following notation will be used: if Z ⊆
Q
i∈I X
i
and I 0 ⊆ I, I denote by −→Z I0 the projection of Z into Qi∈I0 Xi. Formally,
−→
Z I
0
=
(
x ∈
Y
i∈I0
Xi
¯¯¯¯
¯ (∃z ∈ Z) (∀i ∈ I 0) : zi = xi
)
In the case when I0 is a singleton, I denote −→Z {i} simply by −→Z i.
1.2 Consumers:
The specific problem of consumption choice deserves attention in its own right.
I assume that there is a nonempty, finite set of consumers, I = {1, ..., I}, and
a finite number L ∈ N of consumption goods. Hence, each individual chooses a
bundle from the nonnegative orthant of the L-dimensional space, which means
that Xi = RL+. I further assume that individuals face constraints of the usual
form of individual budgets. Hence, I assume that there is a set of data, D,
consisting of strictly positive, normalized prices and strictly positive individual
endowments. Formally, this is: D ⊆ SL−1++ ×
¡
RL++
¢I
, where SL−1++ is the (L− 1)-
dimensional simplex of strictly positive prices:
SL−1++ =
(
p ∈ RL++
¯¯ LX
l=1
pl = 1
)
Typical elements of D will be denoted by (p, e) or
³
p,
¡
ei
¢
i∈I
´
.
Individual budgets are defined as usually: for every p ∈ RL++ and every
ei ∈ RL++, define
B
¡
p, ei
¢
=
©
x ∈ RL+
¯¯
p · x 6 p · eiª
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Given prices p ∈ RL++ and a profile of endowments
¡
ei
¢
i∈I ∈
¡
RL++
¢I
, each
individual faces as constraint B
¡
p, ei
¢
. Social feasibility, however, must take
into account the aggregate endowment of commodities. Hence, given (p, e) ∈
SL−1++ ×
¡
RL++
¢I
define
B (p, e) =
(¡
xi
¢
i∈I ∈
¡
RL+
¢I ¯¯¯ ¡
xi
¢
i∈I ∈
Y
i∈I
B
¡
p, ei
¢
∧
X
i∈I
xi =
X
i∈I
ei
)
As before, for each (p, e) ∈ D, B (p, e) is endowed with a σ-algebra Σp,e
and I assume that one has observed a probability measure γp,e : Σp,e −→ [0, 1],
which satisfy the following straightforward condition:
(∀ (p, e) , (p0, e0) ∈ D) :
¡
B (p, e) = B (p0, e0) =⇒
¡
Σp,e = Σp0,e0 ∧ γp,e = γp0,e0
¢¢
This is all the information that I assume to be observed. Then,
Definition 2 A stochastic collective consumption choice (or demand) isn
I,D, ¡Σp,e, γp,e¢(p,e)∈Do
Throughout the paper, for the purposes of consumption choices, I maintain
the assumption that the following condition holds:
Condition 2 D is finite and for every (p, e) ∈ D, Σp,e is finite.
Remark 1 Given the goal of this paper, I am assuming that the aggregate feasi-
bility constraint always binds. If that is not the case, for example because society
I is open to trade with the rest of the world (and that is why its prices are ex-
ogenously given), then the assumption can be dispensed with and one should
redefine the collective budgets just as
B (p, e) =
Y
i∈I
B
¡
p, ei
¢
2 Strong rationalizability:
2.1 The general case:
If one assumes that decision makers act noncooperatively and are individually
rational, in the sense of maximizing their individual satisfaction subject only
to their own constraints, then for each B ∈ B and each C ∈ ΣB, γB (C) is
understood as the (observed) probability that if each player i chooses from
−→
B i
according to his own preferences, then the collective choice
¡
xi
¢
i∈I lies in the
set C ⊆ B.
To formalize the concept of rationality, I then need to introduce individ-
ual preferences and define the profiles of preferences that will be allowed in
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determining the rationality of the collective choice. I do this as follows. Let
S ∈ N, and for each i ∈ I, let Ri = ©Ri,1, Ri,2, ..., Ri,Sª be a sequence of binary
relations over Xi. Let R be the set that contains the profiles of preferences con-
formed by the individual sequences: R = ©¡R1,s, R2,s, ..., RI,s¢ªSs=1. By R ∈ R,
I denote the profile
¡
Ri
¢
i∈I =
¡
R1, R2, ..., RI
¢
.
For definiteness, it is convenient that for each i ∈ I, each s ∈ {1, ..., S} and
each B ∈ B, the set of Ri,s-maximal elements over −→B i be a singleton. That is
to say:
(∀i ∈ I) (∀s ∈ {1, ..., S}) (∀B ∈ B)
³
∃x ∈ −→B i
´
:


³
∀x0 ∈ −→B i
´
: xRi,sx0
∧³
∀x0 ∈ −→B i\ {x}
´
: ¬x0Ri,sx


To express this idea, the following notation, which is usual in economics, is
introduced. For each i ∈ I, each s ∈ {1, ..., S} and each B ∈ B
Argmax−→B i
Ri,s =
n
x ∈ −→B i
¯¯¯ ³³
∀x0 ∈ −→B i
´
: xRi,sx0
´
∧
³³
∀x0 ∈ −→B i\ {x}
´
: ¬x0Ri,sx
´o
Under the uniqueness assumption, one can further define, implicitly,½
argmax−→B i
Ri,s
¾
= Argmax−→B i
Ri,s
Hence, for the sake of concreteness, for the remainder of this section I assume
that one of the following cases holds:
Case FS: For every i ∈ I, Xi is finite and for each i ∈ I and each
s ∈ {1, ..., S}, Ri,s is an order over Xi.
Case IS : For every i ∈ I, Xi is infinite and for each i ∈ I and each
s ∈ {1, ..., S}, Ri,s is a weak order over Xi such that for every B ∈ B,
#Argmax−→B i
Ri,s = 1
I can now state the concept of rationality, for a given family of profile pref-
erences R:
Definition 3 The stochastic collective choicen
I, ¡Xi¢i∈I ,B, (ΣB, γB)B∈Bo
is R-rationalizable if there exists a probability measure δ : P (R) −→ [0, 1] such
that for each B ∈ B and each C ∈ ΣB,
γB (C) = δ
Ã(
R ∈ R|
µ
argmax−→B i
Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ C
)!
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Hence, R-rationalizability of a stochastic collective choice is obtained when
one can explain the observed probabilities by pure individual rationality, via a
probabilistic distribution over the profiles of preferences in R. For the definition
to be nonvacuous, I assume that the stochastic collective choice satisfies the
following condition:
Condition 3 Denoting for each I 0 ⊆ I and each B ∈ B,
BI0,B =
n
B0 ∈ B| (∀i ∈ I 0) : −→B0i = −→B i
o
it is true that for each I 0 ⊆ I and each B ∈ B,\
B0∈BI0,B
−→
B0I
0 6= ∅
This condition implies that all the collective budgets leave room for players to
choose by pure individual rationality, without violating the aggregate conditions
that define the collective budget. The kind of problem that I want to rule out is
illustrated in figure ??. Suppose that I > 2. If there exist bB, eB ∈ B such that−→bB i and−→eB i are as depicted in the figure, then, irrespectively of the σ-algebras
Σ bB and Σ eB and, more importantly, of the actual distributions γ bB and γ eB, the
data would be nonrationalizable, since the definition would require that with
probability one, the vectors of maximizers for players 1 and 2 lie, at the same
time, in one of the two dashed lines and in the solid line, which do not intersect.
1X
2X
I '→
Bˆ
I '→
B~
11
ˆ~
→→
= BB
22
ˆ~
→→
= BB
Of course, the fact that individuals can choose individually without violating
collective constraints does not mean that they want to do so. It is clear that
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the definition of rationalizability imposes some “correlation” between the pref-
erences of decision-makers. Hence under the null hypothesis of rationalizability,
there should arise no conflict between individual and aggregate feasibility, or,
better yet, this conflict should arise with probability zero and can therefore be
dismissed.2 Hence, I assume that the stochastic collective choice and the family
of profiles of preferences satisfy the following condition:
Condition 4 For each B ∈ B and each R ∈ Rµ
argmax−→B i
Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ B
The following characterization of R-rationalizability is derived from McFad-
den and Richter (1990), theorem 2.3 Define the binary function
α : R×
[
B∈B
({B} ×ΣB) −→ {0, 1}
as follows:
(∀R ∈ R) (∀B ∈ B) (∀C ∈ ΣB) : α (R,B,C) =
½
1 if
¡
argmax−→B i R
i¢
i∈I ∈ C
0 otherwise
Theorem 1 The stochastic collective choicen
I, ¡Xi¢i∈I ,B, (ΣB, γB)B∈Bo
is R-rationalizable if, and only if, for every K ∈ N and every {Bk, Ck}Kk=1
seq
⊆S
B∈B
¡{B} ×ΣB¢, there exists R ∈ R such that
KX
k=1
γBk (Ck) 6
KX
k=1
α (R,Bk, Ck)
Proof. Define the ternary relation Γ on
R×
[
B∈B
¡{B} ×ΣB¢
2Put another way, if this assumption does not hold, then under the hypothesis of individual
rationality one could not be observing the data set that I assume is being observed.
3 If it just so happens that for each B ∈ B,
B =
Y
i∈I
−→
B i
and all the binary relations Ri,s are representable, then theorem 1 follows directly from
Theorem 2 in McFadden Richter (1990), since maximizing individual relations over individual
domains in then equivalent to maximizing their sum over the Cartesian product of those
domains.
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as follows:
(∀R ∈ R) (∀B ∈ B) ¡∀C ∈ ΣB¢ : Γ (R,B,C)⇐⇒ µargmax−→B i Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ C
Then, by construction,
Γ (R,B,C) =⇒ C ∈ ΣB
whereas
Γ (R,B,C) ⇐⇒
µ
argmax−→B i
Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ C
⇐⇒ ¬
Ãµ
argmax−→B i
Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ B\C
!
⇐⇒ ¬Γ (R,B,B\C)
Also, the collective choice is R-rationalizable if, and only if, ∃δ : P (R) −→
[0, 1], a probability measure, such that
(∀B ∈ B) ¡∀C ∈ ΣB¢ : γB (C) = δ {R ∈ R|Γ (R,B,C)}
and, by construction, that
(∀R ∈ R) (∀B ∈ B) ¡∀C ∈ ΣB¢ : α (R,B,C) = 1⇐⇒ Γ (R,B,C)
Although each Xi need not be finite, since, by condition 1, each B is finite and
each ΣB is finite, it then follows from McFadden and Richter (1990), theorem
2 and footnote 30, that the collective choice is R-rationalizable if, and only if,
∀K ∈ N and ∀ {Bk, Ck}
seq
⊆
S
B∈B
¡{B} ×ΣB¢,
KX
k=1
γBk (Ck) 6 maxR∈R
KX
k=1
α (R,Bk, Ck)
which occurs if, and only if, ∃R ∈ R such that
KX
k=1
γBk (Ck) 6
KX
k=1
α (R,Bk, Ck)
The condition of this theorem is what McFadden and Richter have called the
“Axiom of Stochastic Revealed Preferences.” Its intuition is that events that are
likely to happen should happen often. That is, if one considers the event “for
each k, if a each individual chooses from
−→
B ik, then, collectively, they choose
an element of Ck,” and such an event occurs with a “high probability”, in the
sense that the left-hand side of the condition of the theorem is “high,” then, it
should also be true that for at least one of the preferences profiles, it happens
that from “many” of the budgets Bk, the group would choose an element of Ck,
which would make the right-hand side of the condition “high” as well.
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2.2 Consumers:
As before, in order to formalize the concept of rationality, I need to introduce in-
dividual preferences. Let S ∈ N and for each i ∈ I, letRi = ©Ri,1, Ri,2, ..., Ri,Sª
be a sequence of continuous, strictly monotone and strongly convex weak orders
over RL+. Define again the set of profiles of preferences
R = ©¡R1,s, R2,s, ..., RI,s¢ªSs=1
In this particular case, the hypothesis of pure individual rationality means
that for every pair of observed prices and endowments, (p, e) ∈ D, and for every
discernible subset C of the collective budget B (p, e), the observed probability
γp,e (C) is understood as the probability that if each individual chooses from
B
¡
p, ei
¢
, then the collective choice lies in C. This is precisely the formal diﬀer-
ence for which this is not a particular case of IS: now individuals choose from
supersets of the projections of the socially feasible budgets.
Again, rationalizability attains when one can explain the observed stochastic
choice via a distribution of profiles of preferences under the hypothesis of pure
individual rationality. Then,
Definition 4 The stochastic collective consumption choicen
I,D, ¡Σp,e, γp,e¢(p,e)∈Do
is R-rationalizable if there exists a probability measure δ : P (R) −→ [0, 1] such
that for every (p, e) ∈ D and every C ∈ Σp,e,
γp,e (C) = δ
µ½
R ∈ R|
µ
arg max
B(p,ei)
Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ C
¾¶
Since this case does not deal with the projection of the collective budgets,
one does not need to assume a condition analogous to 3. However, for the sake of
feasibility it is still necessary that people do want to choose consumption bundles
that satisfy aggregate feasibility. Hence, for the remainder of this subsection I
assume that the data set D and the family of profiles R satisfy the following
condition:
Condition 5 For every (p, e) ∈ D and every R ∈ R,X
i∈I
arg max
B(p,ei)
Ri =
X
i∈I
ei
For this case, define the binary function
α : R× ∪(p,e)∈D ({(p, e)} ×Σp,e) −→ {0, 1}
as follows:
(∀R ∈ R) (∀ (p, e) ∈ D) (∀C ∈ Σp,e) :
α (R, (p, e) , C) =
½
1 if
¡
argmaxB(p,ei)R
i¢
i∈I ∈ C
0 otherwise
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Theorem 2 The stochastic collective consumption choicen
I,D, ¡Σp,e, γp,e¢(p,e)∈Do
is R-rationalizable if, and only if, for every K ∈ N and every {(p, e)k , Ck}Kk=1
seq
⊆S
(p,e)∈D ({(p, e)} ×Σp,e), there exists R ∈ R such that
KX
k=1
γ(p,e)k (Ck) 6
KX
k=1
α (R, (p, e)k , Ck)
Proof. The argument is similar to the one given on the proof of theorem 1,
except that one now needs to define the ternary relation Γ on
R×
[
(p,e)∈D
({(p, e)} ×Σp,e)
as follows:
(∀R ∈ R) (∀ (p, e) ∈ D) (∀C ∈ Σp,e) :
Γ (R, (p, e) , C) ⇐⇒
µ
arg max
B(p.ei)
Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ C
The argument goes through, because it is again true that, by construction,
Γ (R, (p, e) , C) =⇒ C ∈ Σp,e
whereas
Γ (R, (p, e) , C) ⇐⇒
µ
arg max
B(p.ei)
Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ C
⇐⇒ ¬
µµ
arg max
B(p.ei)
Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ B (p, e) \C
¶
⇐⇒ ¬Γ (R, (p, e) , B (p, e) \C)
Remark 2 Following the point of remark 1 before, if aggregate feasibility can
be disregarded, then R need not be assumed to satisfy condition 5, but, under
the redefinition of each B (p, e) and each Σp,e, theorem 2 still holds, as follows
immediately from theorem 1
3 Weak rationalizability:
In section 2, I assumed that a finite family of individual preference relations and
the way in which form profiles of preferences were given, and the rationalizability
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problem reduced to assigning probabilities to those profiles. Rationalizability in
such a sense appears to be too strong, since one usually has no a priori informa-
tion on preferences, and data sets may fail to be R-rationalizable only because
of the particular R in use. I now weaken the definition of rationalizability to
test for the existence some family R such that the data are consistent with it,
under some probability distribution and assuming purely individually-rational
behavior.
3.1 The general case:
I now assume that one knows a nonempty, finite set of states of the world Ω,
and that for each i ∈ I, one only fixes a class Ri of binary relations over Xi.
As before, I restrict attention only to families of preferences that give unique
maximizers over the individual domains under consideration. That is, I assume
that for each i ∈ I, each Ri ∈ Ri and each B ∈ B
#Argmax−→B i
Ri = 1
and maintain the implicit notation½
argmax−→B i
Ri
¾
= Argmax−→B i
Ri
Specifically, for the purposes of this subsection I now assume that one of the
following cases is true:
Case FW : For every i ∈ I, Xi is finite and Ri is the family of orders over
Xi.
Case IW : For every i ∈ I, Xi is infinite and Ri is the family of all weak
orders Ri over Xi such that for every Bi ∈ Bi,
#Argmax
Bi
Ri = 1
Weak rationality is obtained if one can assign to each state of the world a
profile of preferences and a probability which are able to explain the observed
probabilities via pure individual rationality:
Definition 5 The stochastic collective choicen
I, ¡Xi¢i∈I ,B, (ΣB, γB)B∈Bo
is Ω-rationalizable if there exists a probability measure δ : P (Ω) −→ [0, 1] and
a function R : Ω −→
Q
i∈IRi such that for each B ∈ B and each C ∈ ΣB,
γB (C) = δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
argmax−→B i
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ C
)!
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Following is the analogous to theorem 1 for this weaker definition of ratio-
nalizability. I first introduce the following notation: for every set Z ⊆
Q
i∈I X
i,
the indicator functions 1Z :
Q
i∈I X
i −→ {0, 1} is defined by
1Z (z) =
½
1 if z ∈ Z
0 otherwise
Theorem 3 The stochastic collective choicen
I, ¡Xi¢i∈I ,B, (ΣB, γB)B∈Bo
is Ω-rationalizable if, and only if, for each i ∈ I, each B ∈ B and each ω ∈ Ω
there exists xi,B,ω ∈ −→B i such that for every K ∈ N and every {Bk,Ck}Kk=1
seq
⊆S
B∈B
¡{B} ×ΣB¢:
1. (∀i ∈ I) (∀ω ∈ Ω) :³
(∀k ∈ {1, ...,K − 1}) : xi,Bk+1,ω ∈ −→B ik
´
=⇒
³
xi,BK ,ω = xi,B1,ω ∨ xi,B1,ω /∈ −→B iK
´
2. (∃ω ∈ Ω) :
KX
k=1
γBk (Ck) 6
KX
k=1
1Ck
³¡
xi,Bk,ω
¢
i∈I
´
Proof. Necessity: Let δ : P (Ω) −→ [0, 1] and R : Ω −→ Qi∈IRi be the
functions that Ω-rationalize the choice. Define, implicitly, for each i ∈ I, each
B ∈ B and each ω ∈ Ω: n
xi,B
i,ω
o
= Argmax−→B i
Ri (ω)
Clearly, xi,B,ω ∈ −→B i. Since the deterministic individual choice³
xi,B,ω,
−→
B i
´
B∈B
is regular-rational, it follows from Richter (1966), theorem 1, that it must satisfy
the Congruence Axiom which is condition (1).
Moreover, define
R = {R (ω)}ω∈Ω
and eδ = P (R) −→ [0, 1] by
(∀Q ∈ P (R)) : eδ (Q) = δ ({ω ∈ Ω|R (ω) ∈ Q})
It is clear that eδ is a probability measure, while if B ∈ B and C ∈ ΣB, then
γB (C) = δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
argmax−→B i
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ C
)!
= eδÃ(R ∈ R|µargmax−→B i Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ C
)!
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which means that eδ stochastically R-rationalizes the collective choice. Since
S = #R 6 #Ω < ∞, it then follows from theorem 1 that ∀K ∈ N and
∀ {Bk,Ck}Kk=1
seq
⊆
S
B∈B
¡{B} ×ΣB¢, ∃ eR ∈ R:
KX
k=1
γBk (Ck) 6
KX
k=1
α
³ eR,Bk, Ck´
Where α is defined as in subsection 2.1. Letting ω ∈ R−1
³ eR´ ⊆ Ω, it follows
that ∃ω ∈ Ω :
KX
k=1
γBk (Ck) 6
KX
k=1
α (R (ω) , Bk, Ck)
from where (2) follows, since ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀B ∈ B and ∀C ∈ ΣB :
α (R (ω) , B,C) = 1 ⇐⇒
µ
argmax−→B i
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ C
⇐⇒
¡
xi,B,ω
¢
i∈I ∈ C
⇐⇒ 1C
³¡
xi,B,ω
¢
i∈I
´
= 1
Suﬃciency: Fix i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω. Since
³
xi,B,ω,
−→
B i
´
B∈B
satisfies the
Congruence Axiom, which is condition 1, it follows from Richter (1966), theorem
1,4 that ∃Ri,ω ∈ Ri such that
(∀B ∈ B) : argmax−→B i
Ri,ω = xi,B,ω
DefineR =
n¡
Ri,ω
¢
i∈I
o
ω∈Ω
. LetK ∈ N and {Bk,Ck}Kk=1
seq
⊆
S
B∈B
¡{B} ×ΣB¢.
Using condition 2, by construction, ∃ω ∈ Ω :
KX
k=1
γB(k)
¡
C(k)
¢
6
KX
k=1
1Ck
³¡
xi,Bk,ω
¢
i∈I
´
=
KX
k=1
1Ck
ÃÃ
argmax−→B ik
Ri,ω
!
i∈I
!
=
KX
k=1
α
³¡
Ri,ω
¢
i∈I , Bk, Ck
´
4 In case FW , this theorem only implies that ∃ eRi,ω , a weak order, such that ∀B ∈ B,
argmax−→B i
eRi,ω = xi,B,ω
But then one can modify eRi,ω to make it irreflexive without losing the former property, by
arbitrarily ordering the subset:n
x ∈ Xi
¯¯
(∀B ∈ B) : xi,B,ω 6= x
o
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which implies by theorem 1, since S = #R 6 #Ω < ∞, that there exists
a probability measure eδ : P (R) −→ [0, 1] that R-rationalizes the collective
choice.
Define R : Ω −→
Q
i∈I Ri and δ : P (Ω) −→ [0, 1] by:
(∀ω ∈ Ω) : R (ω) =
¡
Ri,ω
¢
i∈I
(∀Φ ∈ P (Ω)) : δ (Φ) = eδ ³n¡Ri,ω¢i∈I ∈ R¯¯¯ω ∈ Φo´
That δ is a probability measure is straightforward. Now, let B ∈ B and
C ∈ ΣB. Then,
δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
argmax−→B i
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ C
)!
= eδÃ(¡Ri,ω¢i∈I ∈ R¯¯¯ µargmax−→B i Ri,ω
¶
i∈I
∈ C
)!
= γB (C)
which implies that δ and R Ω-rationalizen
I, ¡Xi¢i∈I ,B, (ΣB, γB)B∈Bo
3.2 Consumers:
I again assume that a nonempty, finite set of states of the world Ω is given and
let R be the class of continuous, strictly monotone and strongly concave weak
orders over RL+. In this case:
Definition 6 The stochastic collective consumption choicen
I,D, ¡Σp,e, γp,e¢(p,e)∈Do
is Ω-rationalizable if there exists a probability measure δ : P (Ω) −→ [0, 1] and
a function R : Ω −→ RI such that for each (p, e) ∈ D and each C ∈ Σp,e,
γp,e (C) = δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
arg max
B(p,ei)
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ C
¾¶
The following result is analogous to theorem 3
Theorem 4 The stochastic collective consumption choicen
I,D, ¡Σp,e, γp,e¢(p,e)∈Do
is Ω-rationalizable if, and only if, for each i ∈ I, each (p, e) ∈ D and each ω ∈ Ω
there exist xi,(p,e),ω ∈ RL+, λi,(p,e),ω ∈ R++ and V i,(p,e),ω ∈ R such that:
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1. (∀ (p, e) ∈ D) (∀ω ∈ Ω) : X
i∈I
xi,(p,e),ω =
X
i∈I
ei
2. (∀i ∈ I) (∀ω ∈ Ω) ¡∀ (p, e) , (p, e)0 ∈ D¢ :
p · xi,B(p,ei),ω = p · ei
and
V i,(p,e)
0,ω > V i,(p,e),ω + λi,(p,e),ωp ·
³
xi,(p,e)
0,ω − xi,(p,e),ω
´
with strict inequality if
xi,(p,e)
0,ω 6= xi,(p,e),ω
3. (∀K ∈ N)
µ
∀ {(pk,ek) , Ck}Kk=1
seq
⊆
S
(p,e)∈D ({(p, e)} ×Σp,e)
¶
(∃ω ∈ Ω) :
KX
k=1
γpk,ek (Ck) 6
KX
k=1
1Ck
³¡
xi,pk,ek,ω
¢
i∈I
´
Proof. The argument is similar to the one given for theorem 3.
Necessity: Let δ : P (Ω) −→ [0, 1] and R : Ω −→ RI be the functions that
Ω-rationalize the choice. Define, again, for each i ∈ I, each (p, e) ∈ D and each
ω ∈ Ω:
xi,(p,e),ω = arg max
B(p,ei)
Ri (ω)
The first part of condition (2) is straightforward, while condition (1) follows
from the definition of Ω-rationalizability, since γp,e (B (p, e)) = 1. Moreover,
since the deterministic demandn
xi,(p,e),ω, B
¡
p, ei
¢o
(p,e)∈D
is rationalized by a continuous, strongly concave and strictly monotone utility
function, the second part of condition (2) follows from Matzkin and Richter
(1991), theorem 2, (b)=⇒(c).
Moreover, define
R = {R (ω)}ω∈Ω
and eδ = P (R) −→ [0, 1] by
(∀Q ∈ P (R)) : eδ (Q) = δ ({ω ∈ Ω|R (ω) ∈ Q})
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It is clear that eδ is a probability measure, while if (p, e) ∈ D and C ∈ Σp,e, then
γp,e (C) = δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
arg max
B(p,ei)
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ C
¾¶
= eδµ½R ∈ R|µarg max
B(p,ei)
Ri
¶
i∈I
∈ C
¾¶
which means that eδ stochastically R-rationalizes the collective choice. Since
S = #R 6 #Ω <∞, it then follows from theorem 2 that ∀K ∈ N and
∀ {(pk, ek) , Ck}Kk=1
seq
⊆
[
(p,e)∈D
({(p, e)} ×Σp,e)
∃ eR ∈ R:
KX
k=1
γpk,ek (Ck) 6
KX
k=1
α
³ eR, (pk, ek) , Ck´
where α is defined as in subsection 2.2. Letting ω ∈ R−1
³ eR´ ⊆ Ω, it is true
that ∃ω ∈ Ω :
KX
k=1
γpk,ek (Ck) 6
KX
k=1
α (R (ω) , (pk, ek) , Ck)
from where 3 follows, since ∀ω ∈ Ω, ∀ (p, e) ∈ D and ∀C ∈ Σp,e :
α (R (ω) , (p, e) , C) = 1 ⇐⇒
µ
arg max
B(p,ei)
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ C
⇐⇒
³
xi,(p,e),ω
´
i∈I
∈ C
⇐⇒ 1C
µ³
xi,(p,e),ω
´
i∈I
¶
= 1
Suﬃciency: Fix i ∈ I and ω ∈ Ω. Since ©xi,(p,e),ω, B ¡p, ei¢ª
(p,e)∈D sat-
isfies condition (2), it follows from Matzkin and Richter (1991), theorem 2,
(c)=⇒(b) that ∃Ri,ω ∈ Ri such that
(∀ (p, e) ∈ D) : arg max
B(p,ei)
Ri,ω = xi,(p,e),ω
Define R =
n¡
Ri,ω
¢
i∈I
o
ω∈Ω
. Let K ∈ N and
{(pk, ek) , Ck}Kk=1
seq
⊆
[
(p,e)∈D
({(p, e)} ×Σp,e)
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By condition (1), it follows that condition 5 is satisfied, whereas by condition
(3), ∃ω ∈ Ω :
KX
k=1
γ(pk,ek)
¡
C(k)
¢
6
KX
k=1
1Ck
µ³
xi,(pk,ek),ω
´
i∈I
¶
=
KX
k=1
1Ck
ÃÃ
arg max
B(pk,eik)
Ri,ω
!
i∈I
!
=
KX
k=1
α
³¡
Ri,ω
¢
i∈I , (pk, ek) , Ck
´
which implies, by theorem 2, that there exists a probability measure eδ : P (R) −→
[0, 1] that R-rationalizes the collective choice.
Define R : Ω −→ RI and δ : P (Ω) −→ [0, 1] by:
(∀ω ∈ Ω) : R (ω) =
¡
Ri,ω
¢
i∈I
(∀Φ ∈ P (Ω)) : δ (Φ) = eδ ³n¡Ri,ω¢i∈I ∈ R¯¯¯ω ∈ Φo´
That δ is a probability measure is straightforward. Now, let (p, e) ∈ D and
C ∈ Σp,e. Then,
δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
arg max
B(p,ei)
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ C
¾¶
= eδµ½¡Ri,ω¢i∈I ∈ R¯¯¯ µarg maxB(p,ei)Ri,ω
¶
i∈I
∈ C
¾¶
= γp,e (C)
4 Nonrationalizable data sets:
The previous sections characterize stochastic, collective rationalizability. I now
show examples of collective choices that are not weakly (and therefore not
strongly) rationalizable, which implies that the individual rationality hypothesis
is refutable in this context.
4.1 Finite choice sets:
Consider case FWfirst.
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4.1.1 Example 1:
Let I = {1, 2}. Suppose that X1 = X2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and let B =
n bB, eBo,
where bB and eB are as follows:
bB =



(1, 5)
(1, 4) (2, 4)
(1, 3) (2, 3) (3, 3)
(1, 2) (2, 2) (3, 2) (4, 2)
(1, 1) (1, 2) (1, 3) (1, 4) (1, 5)



eB =



(1, 5) (2, 5) (3, 5) (4, 5) (5, 5)
(2, 4) (3, 4) (4, 4) (5, 4)
(3, 3) (4, 3) (5, 3)
(4, 2) (5, 2)
(5, 1)



Define bC = {(1, 5) , (1, 4) , (2, 4)} and eC = X1 × {5} and suppose that Σ bB =n
∅, bB, bC, bB\ bCo and Σ eB = n∅, eB, eC, eB\ eCo. Finally, suppose that γ bB ³ bC´ =
1/3 and γ eB
³ eC´ = 1/2.
I now show that there cannot exist Ω such that the data set described above
is Ω-rationalizable.
To see this, notice that, since
−→bB 1 = −→eB 1 = X1 and −→bB 2 = −→eB 2 = X2,
rationalizability would imply that
(∀B ∈ B) (∀ω ∈ Ω) :
µ
argmax−→B i
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ D
where
D =
©
x ∈ X1 ×X2¯¯x1 + x2 = 6ª
so that one needs to consider D only and see that under rationalizability,
1/3 = γ bB
³ bC´
= δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
argmax
Xi
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ {(2, 4) , (1, 5)}
¾¶
> δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
argmax
Xi
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
= (1, 5)
¾¶
= γ eB
³ eC´
= 1/2.
an obvious impossibility.
This shows that these data are not weakly rationalizable and cannot there-
fore be strongly rationalized, despite the facts that B satisfies the first feasibility
assumption of section 2, and one can construct R such that the second assump-
tion of feasibility is satisfied by letting R2,s be the opposite order to R1,s, for
R1,s ∈ R.
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4.1.2 Example 2:
Let I = {1, 2}. Suppose that X1 = X2 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, and let B =
n bB, eBo,
where bB and eB are as follows:bB = {1, 2} ×X2eB = {1, 2, 3, 4} ×X2
Suppose that {(1, 1) , (1, 2)} ∈ Σ bB, {(1, 3) , (1, 4) , (1, 5)} ∈ Σ bB and that {1} ×
X2 ∈ Σ eB . Moreover, let
γ bB ({(1, 1) , (1, 2)}) = 1/6
γ bB ({(1, 3) , (1, 4) , (1, 5)}) = 1/6
γ eB ¡{1} ×X2¢ = 1/2
It is straightforward that these data are not rationalizable, since rationalizability
would require that
δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω| argmax
{1,2}
R1 (ω) = 1
¾¶
= δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
Ã
argmax−→bB i R
i (ω)
!
i∈I
∈ {1} ×X2
)!
= δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
Ã
argmax−→bB i R
i (ω)
!
i∈I
∈ {(1, 1) , (1, 2)}
)!
+δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
Ã
argmax−→bB i R
i (ω)
!
i∈I
∈ {(1, 3) , (1, 4) , (1, 5)}
)!
= γ bB ({(1, 1) , (1, 2)}) + γ bB ({(1, 3) , (1, 4) , (1, 5)})
= 1/3
whereas
δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω| arg max
{1,2,3,4}
R1 (ω) = 1
¾¶
= δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
Ã
argmax−→eB i R
i (ω)
!
i∈I
∈ {1} ×X2
)!
= γ eB ¡{1} ×X2¢
= 1/2
which is impossible since when choosing from {1, 2} only, a stochastically ra-
tional individual would choose 1 at least at frequently as when choosing from
{1, 2, 3, 4} . Indeed, this behavior by agent 1 would violate the Regularity Prin-
ciple of Block and Marshak (1960).
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It then follows that this data set is not weakly rationalizable and, therefore,
it is not strongly rationalizable, despite the fact that the feasibility assumptions
of section 2 are trivially satisfied, given the shape of the collective budgets.
4.2 Infinite choice sets:
It is now very easy to find nonrationalizable data sets for case IW, since one can
simply extend the examples given for the finite case.
4.2.1 Example 1:
Let I = {1, 2}. Suppose that X1 = X2 = [1, 5], and let B =
n bB, eBo, wherebB and eB are as drawn in figure ?? (including their boundaries). Define bC
and eC as in those figures and suppose that Σ bB = n∅, bB, bC, bB\ bCo and Σ eB =n
∅, eB, eC, eB\ eCo. Finally, suppose that γ bB ³ bC´ = 1/3 and γ eB ³ eC´ = 1/2.
1 2
5
4 Bˆ
Cˆ
5
1 1.5
4.5
5
B~
C~
5
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I now show that there cannot exist Ω such that the data set described above
is Ω-rationalizable. To see this, notice that, since
−→bB 1 = −→eB 1 = X1 and −→bB 2 =−→eB 2 = X2, rationalizability would imply that
(∀B ∈ B) (∀ω ∈ Ω) :
µ
argmax−→B i
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ D
where
D =
©
x ∈ X1 ×X2¯¯x1 + x2 = 6ª
so that one can restrict attention to D only and see that under rationalizability,
1/3 = γ bB
³ bC´
= δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
argmax
Xi
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ D ∧ argmax
X1
R1 (ω) 6 2
¾¶
> δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
argmax
Xi
Ri (ω)
¶
i∈I
∈ D ∧ argmax
X1
R1 (ω) 6 1.5
¾¶
= γ eB
³ eC´
= 1/2.
an obvious impossibility.
This shows that these data are not weakly rationalizable and cannot there-
fore be strongly rationalized, despite the facts that B satisfies the first feasibility
assumption of section 2, and one can construct R such that the second assump-
tion of feasibility is satisfied by letting R2,s be the opposite order to R1,s, for
any R1,s ∈ R.
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4.2.2 Example 2:
1 1.5 2
1
2
5
1 1.5 4
1
5
2Cˆ
1Cˆ
Bˆ
C~
B~
Let I = {1, 2}. Suppose that X1 = X2 = [1, 5], and let B =
n bB, eBo, wherebB and eB are as drawn in figure ??. Let bC1 and bC2 be defined as in the upper
panel and let eC be defined as in the lower panel.
Suppose that bC1, bC2 ∈ Σ bB and that eC ∈ Σ eB. Moreover, let
γ bB
³ bC1´ = 1/6
γ bB
³ bC2´ = 1/6
γ eB
³ eC´ = 1/2
It is straightforward that these data are not rationalizable, since rationalizability
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would require that
δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω| argmax
[1,2]
R1 (ω) ∈ [1, 1.5]
¾¶
= δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
Ã
argmax−→bB i R
i (ω)
!
i∈I
∈ [1, 1.5]×X2
)!
= δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
Ã
argmax−→bB i R
i (ω)
!
i∈I
∈ bC1)!
+δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
Ã
argmax−→bB i R
i (ω)
!
i∈I
∈ bC2)!
= γ bB
³ bC1´+ γ bB ³ bC2´
= 1/3
whereas
δ
µ½
ω ∈ Ω| argmax
[1,4]
R1 (ω) ∈ [1, 1.5]
¾¶
= δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
Ã
argmax−→eB i R
i (ω)
!
i∈I
∈ [1, 1.5]×X2
)!
= γ eB
³ eC´
= 1/2
which again violates the Regularity Principle. Indeed, when choosing from [1, 2]
only, a stochastically rational individual choose an element in [1, 1.5] at least at
frequently when choosing from [1, 4].
It then follows that this data set is not weakly rationalizable and, therefore,
it is not strongly rationalizable, despite the fact that the feasibility assumptions
of section 2 are trivially satisfied, given the shape of the collective budgets.
4.3 Consumers:
I now show that there exist nonrationalizable stochastic collective consump-
tion choices. Consider the following data for I = {1, 2}, L = 2, and D =
{(ep, e) , (bp, be)}:
ep = (1, 2)e1 = (1, 2)e2 = (5/3, 2/3)bp = (2, 1)be1 = (2, 1)be2 = (2/3, 5/3)
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Let5
C =



¡¡
x11, x
1
2
¢
,
¡
x21, x
2
2
¢¢
∈ R2+
¯¯


x11 + 2x
1
2 > 5
∧
2x11 + x
1
2 = 5
∧¡
x11, x
1
2
¢
+
¡
x21, x
2
2
¢
= (8/3, 8/3)





and
C0 = {(5/3, 5/3) , (1, 1)}
By construction C ⊆ B (bp, be) and C 0 ⊆ B (ep, e), but suppose further that C ∈
Σbp,be and C0 ∈ Σep,e and
γ bp,be (C) = 1/3
γep,e (C 0) = 1/2
( )1~,~ epB
( )1ˆ,ˆ epB
C ′→ 1
R
R
38
1C ′′
1C ′′′
35
67 35
C
1→
Now, suppose that for some Ω, the choicen
I,D, ¡Σp,e, γp,e¢(p,e)∈Do
is rationalized by δ : P (Ω) −→ [0, 1] and R : Ω −→ R2. Then
δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
arg max
B(ep,ei)Ri (ω)
¶2
i=1
∈ C 0
)!
= γep,e (C 0)
= 1/2
and
δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
arg max
B(bp,bei)Ri (ω)
¶2
i=1
∈ C 0
)!
= γbp,be (C)
= 1/3
5 I will use superindices to denote individuals and subindices to denote commodities.
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Now, consider any
ω0 ∈
(
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
arg max
B(ep,ei)Ri (ω)
¶2
i=1
∈ C 0
)
Suppose initially that δ ({ω0}) > 0.
Figure ?? shows the projection of C into the choice set of individual 1. Notice
that if
arg max
B(bp,be1)R1 (ω0) ∈ C001
then, by aggregate feasibility, since δ ({ω0}) > 0, it should be true that
arg max
B(bp,be2)R2 (ω0) /∈ R2+
which is impossible. On the other hand,
arg max
B(bp,be1)R1 (ω0) ∈ C0001
would violate SARP. Hence, it must be that
arg max
B(bp,be1)R1 (ω0) ∈
−→
C 1
and then, by aggregate feasibility, since δ ({ω0}) > 0, it must be true that
ω0 ∈
(
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
arg max
B(bp,bei)Ri (ω)
¶2
i=1
∈ C 0
)
The only other possibility is that δ ({ω0}) = 0. In any case, it follows that
1/2 = δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
arg max
B(ep,ei)Ri (ω)
¶2
i=1
∈ C 0
)!
6 δ
Ã(
ω ∈ Ω|
µ
arg max
B(bp,bei)Ri (ω)
¶2
i=1
∈ C 0
)!
= 1/3
an obvious contradiction.
5 Concluding remarks:
In this paper I have studied situations in which individuals choose from their
own choice sets, subject only to their own restrictions, and no conflict arises
despite the fact that the set of socially feasible choices may be strictly smaller
than the product of the individually feasible sets. For this to occur, individual
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preferences cannot be distributed across individuals in an arbitrary manner.
The problem is relatively simple when only one collective choice situation is
faced or when individual preferences are assumed to be invariant. A more
interesting situation arises when there is a sequence of exogenously given social
constraints and individual preferences are allowed to change randomly. In this
case, if one has observed probabilistic distributions of collective choices over
the socially feasible sets, one can only maintain the hypothesis of individual
rationality under the assumption that preferences, however random, are not
independent across individuals. The alternative would be to assume that, by
chance or choice, some individuals take into account social feasibility, which
amounts to dropping the usual assumption of individual rationality.
This paper characterizes collective choices in terms of the way in which in-
dividual preferences must co-vary in order to explain observed distributions of
choices, maintaining individual rationality, under some finiteness assumptions.
Two definitions of rationality were considered. In the first one, I assumed that
one is given the set of profiles of preferences that are allowed in the rationaliza-
tion, and the problem reduces to assigning probabilities to those profiles, so as
to explain the observed probabilities. The main result here is that a condition
defined by McFadden and Richter (1990), called the Axiom of Revealed Sto-
chastic Preferences, characterizes rationality. This definition, however, appears
to be too strong in the sense that lack of rationalizability may be due to the
set of profiles of preferences and not to the observed stochastic choice. Put
another way, it could be that some other set of profiles of preferences, when
endowed with some particular probabilities, does explain the observed choices.
This leads to the second, weaker, definition of rationalizability in which one is
given a set of states of the world, and the problem consists in assigning to each
one of them a profile of preferences, within certain classes, and a probability.
Rationalizability in this case is characterized by a combination of the Axiom of
Stochastic Revealed Preferences and several instances of the Congruence Axiom
(or the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences) — as many as there are states
of the world. I finally argued that there exist collective choices that cannot
be rationalized in either sense, which means that the hypothesis of individual
rationality can be refuted.
Of course, one can think of many cases in which one such collective choice
situation would result in conflict between individuals. This paper does not
consider such cases, nor does it consider the consequences, in terms of observed
data, of assuming that individual preferences are independently determined,
which is an interesting topic for future research.
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